DO CONTEMPORANEOUS ARMED CHALLENGES AFFECT THE OUTCOMES OF MASS NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS?*

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Civil resistance is a powerful strategy for promoting major social and political change, yet no study has systematically evaluated the effects of simultaneous armed resistance on the success rates of unarmed resistance campaigns. Using the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO 1.1) data set, which includes aggregate data on 106 primarily nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006 with maximalist political objectives, we find that contemporaneous armed struggles do not have positive effects on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns. We do find evidence for an indirect negative effect, in that contemporaneous armed struggles are negatively associated with popular participation and are, consequently, correlated with reduced chances of success for otherwise-unarmed campaigns. Two paired comparisons suggest that negative violent flank effects operated strongly in two unsuccessful cases (the 8-8-88 challenge in Burma in 1988 and the South African antiapartheid challenge from 1952 to 1961, with violent flanks having both positive and negative impacts in the challenge to authoritarian rule in the Philippines (1983-1986) and the South African antiapartheid campaign (1983-1994). Our results suggest that the political effects are beneficial only in the short term, with much more unpredictable and varied long-term outcomes. Alternately, violent flanks may have both positive and negative political impacts, which make the overall effect of violent flanks difficult to determine. We conclude that large-scale maximalist nonviolent campaigns often succeed despite intra- or extramovement violent flanks, but seldom because of them.

How do contemporaneous armed challenges affect the success of nonviolent mass-resistance campaigns? Scholars, activists, and dissidents alike have long grappled with this question, with some arguing that armed violence can help popular movements to achieve maximalist change, and others suggesting that armed violence undermines the potential of maximalist unarmed uprisings. While this topic has wide-ranging implications for those seeking political and social change, a systematic empirical comparison of the effects of violent flanks vis-à-vis unarmed mass campaigns around the globe remains unexplored. In this article, we systematically assess the impacts of contemporaneous armed challenges on the outcomes of maximalist nonviolent campaigns across a population of cases.

One academic focus germane to this study is the literature on radical flank effects, or the impacts of more radical behavior on the outcomes of moderate political activity. The existing literature suggests that radical flanks can have both positive and negative effects.

With regard to the positive radical flank effect, the literature suggests that moderate challenges enjoy increased leverage when a more extreme or radical challenge exists contemporaneously. The argument is that the activities of radicals (including violent actors) may make
moderate challengers (including nonviolent activists) seem less threatening to elite interests, contribute to public or third party support for moderates, or create a political crisis that is resolved in favor of the moderates (Anner 2009; Braithwaite 2013, 2014; Haines 1984, 1988, 2013; Koopmans 1995; McCammon, Bergner, and Arch 2015). In functional terms, some have also argued that limited uses of violence (e.g., for self-defense) have protected activists from worsening regime or communal violence (Cobb 2014; Wendt 2010). This view avers that a simultaneous violent challenge may therefore increase the likelihood of success of a nonviolent challenge.

Scholars have most commonly examined positive radical flank effects in the context of U.S. social movements. For instance, Freeman (1975) used the radical flank concept to describe those elements within the U.S. women’s liberation movement whose goals deviated from the majority of other movement organizations. Freeman argued that radical organizations and activists influenced mainstream groups by pushing for more action than moderate actors were willing to undertake. She found evidence for a positive radical flank effect, maintaining that radical women’s groups such as lesbian and socialist feminists increased the bargaining power of mainstream reform organizations such as the National Organization for Women. Similarly, McCammon, Bergner, and Arch found that conflict within the Texas women’s movement generated a positive radical flank effect by allowing moderate factions to publicly distance themselves from radicals, thereby creating opportunities to appeal to political elites in ways that helped moderates achieve their goals (2015). With regard to the U.S. civil rights movement, scholars have argued that the emergence of militant Black Power activists helped increase the public’s acceptance of methods of nonviolent action and integrationist goals (Killian 1972; Oberschall 1973, 230). Haines and others have likewise argued that the emergence of the more militant ideology of Black Power and the outbreak of urban riots resulted in increased support and funding for moderate civil rights organizations (Haines 1984, 1988; Jenkins and Eckert 1986). Similarly, only after the mobilization of more radical socialist labor organizations in the early twentieth century did U.S. labor movement demands for collective bargaining and an eight-hour workday became negotiable issues (Ramirez 1978; Rayback 1966). Finally, regarding the pro-life movement, Rohlinger found that moderate organizations may benefit from the more extreme rhetoric of more ideologically rigid organizations, but when the extreme organizations use violence, the moderate ones must distance themselves in order to avoid a negative radical flank effect (2005).

Alternatively, a negative radical flank effect occurs when the activities of radicals undermine the position of moderates. Radical activities can (1) provoke widespread repression against all challengers (Barrell 1994; Pearlman 2011), (2) reduce popular participation in campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), (3) discredit all regime opponents (Sharp 1973), and (4) alienate potential third-party supporters (Wasow 2015). The literature on civil resistance often advances the view that simultaneous violent challenges undermine the leverage of nonviolent struggles. Central to this assertion are the concepts of strategic advantage and backfire. The literature suggests that states typically have a strategic advantage with regard to the means of violence, and only under rare conditions are violent insurgents likely to gain the upper hand (Sharp 1973; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Recognizing that states depend upon the continual replenishment of their power, the targets of unarmed resistance lie not where the state is strong (i.e., the military or security apparatus), but rather in the social roots and third parties from which the regime draws its power. Therefore it is not necessary to topple a state through violence, since civilians can topple it through unarmed campaigns of protest, noncooperation, and disobedience that build power from below, decrease the state’s legitimacy, and dislocate its sources of power. Rather than challenging the state on its own terms (i.e., through violence), civilians engaged in nonviolent resistance challenge the state with methods designed to increase popular participation and elicit third party support (Sharp 1973, 2005)—processes that are more likely to occur when the challengers maintain nonviolent action as a primary mode of struggle (Chenoweth and
Stephan 2011). As a result, the implementation of only nonviolent methods of resistance is likely to increase the power of a challenger because the use of violence in this context undermines movement legitimacy, repels potential participants, diverts resources, and confronts the state where it is most powerful.

The literature also suggests that backfire occurs when violent repression of unarmed protest rebounds against the regime by increasing support for challengers and decreasing the state’s legitimacy. Nonviolent discipline among challengers is an important requirement for backfire to occur, since popular outrage against violent state repression of armed insurgents is less likely (Martin 2007; Sharp 1973, 2005).\(^4\) State repression of violent action tends to be perceived as much more legitimate. In fact, states may attempt to label nonviolent movements as “violent” or as “terrorists” or use agents provocateurs to spark violence. The provocation of violence suggests that states might even encourage violence, enabling them to justify violent repression. Thus, the optimal situation for a nonviolent resistance movement, according to assumptions of the civil resistance literature, is strict adherence to nonviolent discipline where its strategic advantage lies. Moreover, in a context where a violent challenge does not exist contemporaneously, the backfire dynamic is more likely to occur, since the regime is less able to convincingly frame the challenge as violent in a context with an absence of armed resistance.

Collectively, however, social movement research on the radical flank effect tends to reflect biases of case selection and context. First, as summarized above, most social movement analyses of positive radical flank effects examine a single movement, often in the United States. Much of the civil resistance literature also focuses on single cases. For example, scholars have argued that radical flanks interrupted the progress of otherwise nonviolent movements in Syria in 2011 (Bartkowski and Kahf 2013) and in the Palestinian national movement during the second Intifada (Pearlman 2011; Rigby 2015). Sharp (1973, 2005) identified instances where “political jiu-jitsu” occurs, but did not explain why the dynamic may occur in some instances but not in others. While such studies are crucial—particularly for theory development—it is impossible to make generalized inferences about the impacts of radical flanks based on single cases.

In fact, the few studies that employ cross-sectional or longitudinal analysis find little support for a positive radical flank effect. For instance, in a study based on a random selection of 53 cases from a population of challenges in the U.S. from 1800 to 1945, Gamson (1990 [1975]) found that, with regard to challenging groups pursuing the same general interests, the existence of more militant organizations did not increase the likelihood of success of less militant organizations.\(^5\) Moreover, evaluating data from thousands of U.S. counties in the 1960s and 1970s, Wasow (2015) demonstrated that proximity to violent protest led higher proportions of voters to choose Republican candidates. Conversely, he found that higher frequencies of nonviolent protest led voters to support Democratic candidates. Similarly, at a national level he found that higher incidences of violent protest led survey respondents to identify “law and order” as the country’s greatest priority, while higher incidences of nonviolent protest led voters to identify civil rights as the most important issue.

Second, social movement scholars have focused overwhelmingly on liberal reform movements in high-capacity democracies. No study, to our knowledge, has examined the impact of violent flanks on the outcomes of unarmed movements in a population of cases of maximalist unarmed challenges across states encompassing a broad range of regime types and levels of state capacity. Nor has any study, to our knowledge, used comparative case studies to assess the presence or absence of the different hypothesized mechanisms of positive and negative radical flank effects that emerge from the civil resistance and social movement literatures.

Third, the existing literature has often conflated short-term tactical goals (e.g., process goals) with long-term outcomes (e.g., strategic goals). Haines, for example, concluded that violence had a positive overall impact on the U.S. civil rights movement by drawing funding and support to the movement (1984, 1988). Funding, support, and increased attention are important process goals for social movements; however, studies that evaluate the long-term
political effects of such activities (e.g., Wasow 2015) suggest that violent flanks may have important strategic costs in terms of the campaign’s ability to succeed in the long run.

**RADICAL VERSUS VIOLENT FLANK EFFECTS**

Part of the disagreement may derive from how studies characterize and define what is radical. While the social movement literature tends to see radical flanks in a variety of ways relating to means and ends, the civil resistance literature tends to characterize them only according to whether they use violence. Looking at both literatures, we identify three criteria that differentiate radicals from moderates based on their (1) methods of action, (2) extent of change sought, and (3) ideology, rhetoric, and stance regarding compromise.

1. Methods of action. Scholars typically view (a) nonviolent direct action as more radical than conventional political action; and (b) violent direct action as more radical than nonviolent direct action.

2. Extent of change sought. Scholars typically view (a) reformist demands as more radical than the status quo; and (b) revolutionary or maximalist demands as more radical than reformist demands.

3. Rhetoric, ideology, and likelihood of compromise. Scholars typically view (a) violent rhetoric as more radical than rhetoric that is not violent; (b) an exclusive ideology as more radical than an inclusive ideology; and (c) an uncompromising stance as more radical than a compromising stance.

To avoid the conflation of important conceptual distinctions between methods, goals, and movement disposition, we narrow our theoretical discussion and inquiry to violent flank effects. When we speak of violent flank effects, we refer to armed challenges by some groups (either intra- or extramovement) occurring at the same time as an otherwise unarmed campaign. Moreover, we avoid comparing radical to moderate goals by only considering radical, maximalist nonviolent campaigns—those with the goals of either removing the incumbent government, national liberation, or secession. All campaigns are extreme or radical relative to the status quo or political reform goals, and all campaigns rely on direct actions outside of conventional political channels. This approach distinguishes this analysis from other studies that conflate violence and radical goals, rhetoric, and ideology of political group.

With regard to methods of political action, nonviolent action refers to unarmed extra-institutional acts that do not directly threaten or harm the physical well being of opponents or bystanders (Sharp 1973). Violent action refers to methods that involve violence or the threat of violence against opponents or bystanders such as armed attacks, physical beatings, or other personal physical integrity violations.

Based on our literature review, and circumscribing the broader radical flank effect to the narrower violent flank effect, we articulate three hypotheses and various mechanisms:

**Hypothesis 1:** Nonviolent campaigns with violent flanks are more likely to succeed than nonviolent campaigns without violent flanks.

**Mechanism 1a:** Nonviolent actors appear as a more acceptable alternative and therefore receive funding and direct support from third parties (derived from Haines 1984, 1988 and McCammon, Bergner, and Arch 2015).

**Mechanism 1b:** Violent actors create a political crisis resolved in favor of nonviolent actors (derived from Haines 1984, 1988).

**Mechanism 1c:** Diffusion of oppositional culture from violent to nonviolent actors facilitates nonviolent mobilization (derived from Isaac et al. 2006).

**Mechanism 1d:** Violent actors protect nonviolent participants from state violence (derived from Cobb 2014; Wendt 2010)
Violent Flank Effects

Hypothesis 2: Nonviolent campaigns without violent flanks are more likely to succeed than nonviolent campaigns with violent flanks.

Mechanism 2a: All challengers are discredited, thus inhibiting broad support or coalition building (derived from Haines 1984, 1988; Sharp 1973).

Mechanism 2b: Authorities respond with widespread and indiscriminate repression (derived from Pearlman 2011; Sharp 1973).

Mechanism 2c: Fewer participants engage in nonviolent action (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

Mechanism 2d: Violent actors alienate potential third-party supporters and decrease the possibility that repression backfires (derived from Martin 2007, 2015).

Hypothesis 3: Violent flanks have no impact on the success rates of nonviolent campaigns.

Regarding the last hypothesis, very few scholars have speculated that violent flanks may have no impact on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns. However, we suggest three reasons why, in a general sense, violent flanks may have no detectable impact. First, violent flanks may have varied impacts across the entire universe of cases. For instance, if violent flanks helped a nonviolent campaign to succeed in South Africa but undermined a nonviolent campaign in Syria, then the net crossnational impact might be 0. Second, violent flanks may have varied impacts within campaigns. For instance, if violent flanks protected activists from state violence but also decreased the number of participants in the nonviolent campaign at the same time, these simultaneous positive and negative effects might also have a net impact of 0. Finally, the ultimate outcomes of nonviolent campaigns may be explained by other factors, such as political opportunity structures in which the campaign is operating (e.g., repressive capacity of the opponent), characteristics of the campaign (e.g., organization and participation rates), or idiosyncratic factors (e.g., timing).

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

We pursue a two-pronged empirical approach to test these hypotheses and further explore their attendant mechanisms. The first stage is a quantitative analysis, which tests our three hypotheses and accounts for potential confounding factors described below. The second stage presents two paired comparisons that allow us to evaluate the operation of the different mechanisms identified in the literature.

Our initial inquiry relies on a quantitative methodology to test our hypotheses among a population of cases with wide variation over time, space, and context.8 We draw on data from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 1.1) data set (Chenoweth 2011), which identifies 106 cases of major nonstate, nonviolent resistance campaigns seeking removal of an incumbent national government, self-determination, secession, or the expulsion of foreign occupation between 1900 and 2006.9 NAVCO defines nonviolent action as extratransitory political action that does not directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of the opponent. Sharp (1973) identified 198 nonviolent tactics, such as sit-ins, protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, and strikes, among many others. When a campaign has an overwhelming reliance on nonviolent methods such as these, NAVCO characterizes the campaign as nonviolent (or unarmed). In highly charged conflict situations, challenger violence often occurs either in self-defense or through agents provocateurs. Thus, NAVCO considers campaigns to be nonviolent if, in addition to overwhelming reliance on nonviolent methods, the leaders deliberately eschew violence and encourage nonviolent discipline in the face of provocations.

NAVCO defines a “campaign” as a series of observable, continuous, purposive collective actions or events in pursuit of a political objective. Campaigns are observable and comprised of overt and documented methods. A campaign is continuous and lasts from days to years, distinguishing it from single events. Campaigns are purposive, meaning that actors have a
specific objective in mind, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic regime. Campaigns have discernable leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from riots or spontaneous mass acts. The unit of analysis is the country year in which a campaign ended.

NAVCO selects campaigns and their beginning and end dates based on consensus data produced by multiple sources that involved existing data sets, numerous case studies and encyclopedias, and expert review. The resultant data set includes 323 maximalist campaigns, 106 nonviolent ones, and 217 violent ones. Since we are interested in the effects that violent flanks have on nonviolent campaigns, we omit the 217 armed campaigns as observations for our purposes.

Departing from prior research that highlights process goals as the relevant outcome of interest, our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable identifying whether or not the maximalist campaign attained its stated objectives of removing an incumbent leader from power or becoming an independent country (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise). NAVCO judges the level of success each campaign achieved according to each campaign’s stated objective and categorizes the outcomes as a success, limited success, or failure. A campaign is considered a success if it meets two criteria: (1) it achieved all of its stated objectives (in terms of the removal of an incumbent leader through irregular means, antioccupation, or secession) within a year of the peak of its activities; and (2) it had a distinguishable effect on the outcome, such that the outcome would likely not have occurred without the campaign. For the purposes of our study, we use a strict criterion for success, counting limited successes as failures and counting ongoing campaigns through 2006 as failures.

Our primary independent variable is the presence of a violent campaign or group in attendance with an otherwise nonviolent campaign. We define violence as the use of armed force to physically harm or threaten to physically harm the opponent. We created two categories of violent flanks: (1) intramovement violent flank, coded as “1” if an armed segment emerged from within the campaign (e.g., South African antiapartheid movement) and “0” otherwise (e.g., Malawi); and (2) extramovement violent flank, coded “1” if there was a contemporaneous violent flank in the country (e.g., Philippines) and “0” otherwise (e.g., student uprising against Rhee in South Korea in 1960). The intramovement violent flank variable includes any cases where an armed segment emerged from within a nonviolent campaign and caused at least one fatality against the opponent. We coded these data from the Global Terrorism Database (LaFree and Dugan 2007), the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (which includes a threshold of 25 battle deaths), various news stories about each campaign, and a wide variety of case study material and encyclopedic descriptions.

Extramovement violent flanks include any cases where a contemporaneous armed group existed in the country separately from a nonviolent campaign. We obtained these data from Gleditsch’s 2004 updates to the Correlates of War database on intrastate wars (COW), Clodfelter’s encyclopedia of armed conflict (2002), Sepp’s list of major counterinsurgency operations (2005), Fearon and Laitin’s dataset on civil wars (2003), and Lyall and Wilson’s list of insurgencies (2009). Using these data, we then created a dummy variable called “violent flank,” which is coded “1” if the campaign had an extramovement or intramovement violent flank and “0” if otherwise.

As hinted above, the impacts of violent flanks on nonviolent campaigns may vary across different types of political regimes, over historical time, and among nonviolent campaigns with different internal capacities and characteristics (Goldstone 1980; Goodwin 2001). This is, in part, because highly repressive and authoritarian states may be likely to crush nonviolent campaigns in their infancy while also being less likely to accede to popular pressure. Moreover, some could argue that nonviolent campaigns may be more likely to mobilize large support when people are not fearful of repression, and states that are unwilling or incapable of repressing popular struggles may be likelier to give in once mass mobilization is underway—hence no violent flank would emerge in the first place. The nature of the sample and empirical
strategy help to counter this possibility in several important ways. First, all of the campaigns were maximalist in their goals, meaning that most of them faced well-armed, capable, and intransigent state opponents. Moreover, all of the campaigns emerged out of highly oppressive circumstances, and virtually all of them experienced violent state repression at some point during the campaign. This fact allows us to account for the impacts of this potential confounder by assuming that all of the units in the study population faced roughly comparable environmental conditions. Some of them developed violent flanks and others did not. Second, prior studies using these data have found no systematic correlations between various state and demographic characteristics that predispose some campaigns to violence and others to non-violent action (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). This suggests that the adoption of armed actions as opposed to strictly nonviolent ones may be highly contingent, ungeneralizable, or even random.

Nevertheless, we are interested in whether structural conditions affect the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns with and without violent flanks. Tilly identifies two fundamental dimensions of regimes: government capacity and democracy. Government capacity refers to the “degree to which governmental actions affect distributions of populations, activities, and resources within the government’s jurisdiction, relative to some standard of quality and efficiency” (2006: 21). Democracy refers to the “extent to which persons subject to the government’s authority have broad, equal rights to influence governmental affairs and to receive protection from arbitrary governmental action” (2006: 21). We obtained data on state capacity from the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities Index (www.correlatesofwar.org) compiled by Chenoweth (2011). High-capacity bureaucratic states with effective control over all their territory are likely to have an overwhelming superiority with regard to the means of violence relative to challengers (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Tilly 2006). We obtained data on democracy from the POLITY IV data set (Jaggers, Marshall, and Gurr 2010). The existence of democratic political channels—however biased they may be—to pursue the redress of grievances may cause violent challenges to appear extremist and illegitimate compared to contexts where such channels are nonexistent. In fact, no armed revolutionary challenge in a democracy has ever succeeded (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989: 495; Martin 2009). Thus, challengers adopting violent strategies in high-capacity or democratic states are typically extinguished by the superior repressive capacities of and public support for the state, respectively. We created an interaction term for regime type and state capacity in the event that their combined effects are more potent than their individual effects.

Data on population size are from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten 2006). Population size could affect the outcomes of the campaigns independently from the existence of a violent flank because governments of large populations typically spend more money on its repressive apparatus. Moreover, the sheer size of the country may make the civil resistance campaign appear less representative of the population as a whole (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

Another argument concerns the impact of historical time on the success rates of non-violent campaigns. From its emergence in mid-eighteenth century Western Europe, the modern social movement became increasingly common over time as it was intertwined with the process of state making and democratization (Tilly 1986, 1995). More specifically, the modern nonviolent resistance movement became more common from the mid-nineteenth century onward after nationalist, labor, and radical reform movements implemented nonviolent resistance on a widespread basis (Randle 1994; Schock 2015). The frequency and effectiveness of unarmed resistance campaigns in the less-developed world increased dramatically in the late twentieth century (Zunes 1994). As the strategy of mass-based nonviolent resistance became increasingly common over the course of the twentieth century, the probability of diffusion and learning across social movements increased (Chabot 2000; Scalmer 2011; King 1999). And the global normative environment, which may place restrictions on states’ abilities to openly suppress nonviolent movements, may also have opened up more opportunities for nonviolent
campaigns to emerge and succeed. Thus we would expect to see an increase in diffusion and learning across nonviolent resistance movements, an increased recognition of the power of nonviolent resistance, and a decline in the ability to suppress them. We therefore create dummy variables for decade based on the end year of each campaign.

Finally, the literature also suggests the likely impacts of the characteristics of civil resistance campaigns on violent flank effects. One argument pertains to the size or extent of mass mobilization. Mass mobilization is important in civil resistance campaigns as high levels of participation make them more resilient and raise the political costs of repression (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2005). However, a contemporaneous violent movement may act as a deterrent for broad-based mass mobilization, because any protest actions are likely to carry higher risk when they occur where there is simultaneous violence. Thus, the existence of simultaneous violent actions—whether or not they are related to a nonviolent campaign—should decrease the level of participation in the nonviolent campaign because they make all acts of resistance riskier. Consequently, lower participation rates reduce the likelihood of the campaign’s success. We therefore include a variable for mass participation, which identifies the peak number of active participants reported in the news from NAVCO (Chenoweth 2011). The measure is logged for normalization. Table 1 contains descriptions of all variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contemporaneous Violent Campaign</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable with 1 = presence; 0 = absence.</td>
<td>NAVCO 1.1 (2011)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>.453</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporaneous Violent Campaign</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable with 1 = presence; 0 = absence</td>
<td>NAVCO 1.1 (2011)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>.385</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporaneous Violent Campaign</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable with 1 = presence; 0 = absence</td>
<td>NAVCO 1.1 (2011)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Polity IV Score</td>
<td>Polity IV (2010)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-3.126</td>
<td>6.156</td>
<td>-10 to 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capacity</td>
<td>Opponent country composite index of national capabilities (CINC Score)</td>
<td>Correlates of War (2009)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Participation</td>
<td>Logged number of estimated participants in peak event</td>
<td>NAVCO 1.1 (2011)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11.054</td>
<td>1.869</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy x State Capacity</td>
<td>Interaction term</td>
<td>Authors’ calculations</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-.128</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable with 1 = full success; 0 = otherwise</td>
<td>NAVCO 1.1 (2011)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>.538</td>
<td>.501</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**QUANTITATIVE RESULTS**

A bivariate crosstabulation demonstrates that violent flanks do not have a statistically significant association with campaign success (see table 2). The results change slightly when we divide the cases into intramovement and extramovement violent campaigns. Intramovement violent flanks
are associated with campaign failure at a statistically significant level, but the association between extramovement violent flanks and campaign success is insignificant. These findings may speak to the possibility that the negative political effects of violent flanks are more severe when the violence emerges from within the nonviolent campaign rather from outside it.

To test the hypotheses while accounting for the various confounding factors identified above, we employ logistic regression that includes robust standard errors clustered around the target country to account for the possibility of a heteroskedastic distribution. We report the substantive findings in table 3 (next page), in which we identify coefficient, robust standard errors, and marginal effects of each covariate on the probability of success for nonviolent campaigns.\textsuperscript{13} Importantly, our sample size is too small to have a great deal of confidence in these findings. Thus these results should be viewed as suggestive only.

The only hypothesis for which we find consistent support is hypothesis 3, that violent flanks have no significant effects on campaign success when we control for other factors, although all coefficients have negative directions. We find no support for a positive violent flank effect (hypothesis 1) in any of the models.

### Table 2. Crosstabulation of Violent Flanks and Campaign Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Outcome</th>
<th>Presence of Violent Flank$^a$</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>22 (46%)</td>
<td>35 (60%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>26 (54%)</td>
<td>23 (40%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58 (100%)</td>
<td>48 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Outcome</th>
<th>Presence of Intramovement Violent Flank$^b$</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>12 (41%)</td>
<td>35 (60%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>17 (59%)</td>
<td>23 (40%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29 (100%)</td>
<td>58 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Outcome</th>
<th>Presence of Extramovement Violent Flank$^c$</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>10 (53%)</td>
<td>35 (60%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>9 (47%)</td>
<td>23 (40%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
<td>58 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $^a$ n = 106; $X^2 = 2.23; p < .136$. $^b$ n = 87; $X^2 = 2.7997; p < .094$. These figures exclude cases where there is an extramovement radical flank. $^c$ n = 77; $X^2 = .3506; p < .554$. These figures exclude cases where there is an intramovement radical flank.
Table 3. Logistic Regression: Effects of Contemporaneous Violent Campaigns on the Success of Nonviolent Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contemporaneous Violent Campaign</td>
<td>-.587 (.449)</td>
<td>-.674 (.587)</td>
<td>-.484 (.514)</td>
<td>-.599 (.532)</td>
<td>-.860 (.610)</td>
<td>-.118 (.540)</td>
<td>-.074 (.488)</td>
<td>-.571 (.488)</td>
<td>-.474 (.868)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.081 (.051)</td>
<td>.077 (.038)</td>
<td>.051 (.047)</td>
<td>.097 (.065)</td>
<td>.043 (.050)</td>
<td>.231%</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
<td>2.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capacity</td>
<td>.533 (5.123)</td>
<td>.383 (4.869)</td>
<td>.261 (8.062)</td>
<td>.178 (5.395)</td>
<td>.373 (2.31)</td>
<td>12.79%</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
<td>2.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-.278 (.196)</td>
<td>-.373 (2.31)</td>
<td>.113 (1.144)</td>
<td>.362*** (.130)</td>
<td>.315** (.141)</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
<td>2.81%</td>
<td>9.06%</td>
<td>7.87%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy x State Capacity</td>
<td>.113 (1.144)</td>
<td>.362*** (.130)</td>
<td>.315** (.141)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Participation</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
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<td>1960s</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>53.83%</td>
<td>60.39%</td>
<td>54.13%</td>
<td>54.36%</td>
<td>54.27%</td>
<td>60.84%</td>
<td>51.21%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>59.43%</td>
<td>35.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $X^2$</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>9.22</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.1656</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.0143</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Log-odds; standard errors in parentheses; percent change in likelihood of success in italics. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Additionally, our results provide no support for hypothesis 2 (negative violent flank effect). In general, the presence of a violent flank has no significant effect on the chances of success of a nonviolent campaign, across any of the various model specifications.

The country’s level of democracy has no effect on the operation of the violent flank effect. We do find, however, that most campaigns have higher rates of success against relatively more democratic opponents. This finding makes sense in light of extant literature, which identifies democratic states as more susceptible to defeat than authoritarian regimes (Merom 2003; Lyall and Wilson 2008). Opponent capacity appears to have no effect on either campaign victory or the effects of violent flanks. Again, this finding corroborates other research that indicates that raw state capacity has little effect on the dynamics of unconventional conflicts (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Lyall and Wilson 2008; Arreguin-Toft 2005). Model 5 finds that the interaction of state capacity and regime type has no effect on the probability of success, nor does its inclusion in the model alter the overall effects of violent flanks on the likelihood of campaign success.

We do find that the success rates for nonviolent campaigns have increased over time (model 6), but we find no support for the notion that temporal changes alter how violent flanks affect the success of nonviolent campaigns. The noneffects of violent flanks seem to persist across decades, contrary to the intuition that the pre- and post-Cold War contexts might be politically distinct from one another in this regard.

Importantly, when more participants engage in nonviolent campaigns they are much more likely to succeed (model 7). This is true even when we control for confounding factors, such as regime type (model 8). When the number of participants increases by one standard deviation, the chances of campaign success increase by seven to nine percent. These findings suggest that a higher level of participation mitigates potential negative violent flank effects that occur when armed campaigns persist alongside nonviolent resistance campaigns.

Upon further investigation, we also find that nonviolent campaign participation is negatively associated with violent flanks. A simple linear regression model estimating the effects of violent flanks on campaign participation (controlling for logged population size) reveals that violent flanks substantially reduce the number of participants in unarmed struggle (table 4). The substantive effects of this relationship are nontrivial—those campaigns with violent flanks average about approximately 50,000 participants, whereas campaigns without violent flanks average about 100,000, holding the country’s population constant. Given the importance of campaign participation on campaign success, this disadvantage could be quite problematic for nonviolent campaigns. If violent flanks dissuade potential participants from joining a nonviolent campaign, then they can have a negative, albeit indirect, effect on campaign success.

Table 4: OLS Regression: Effect of Simultaneous Violent Campaigns on Participation in Nonviolent Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Number of Campaign Participants (logged)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contemporaneous Violent Campaign</td>
<td>-1.08** (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.32** (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.54*** (1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
One might wonder if potential participants in nonviolent campaigns are already involved in violent insurrections. We doubt whether this is the case, since randomized country-level surveys indicate steep differences in individual-level preferences toward (and willingness to engage in) nonviolent resistance compared with armed resistance (e.g., Dorff 2015). Studies also suggest that the barriers to entry and exit in violent campaigns are much higher compared with nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). One might also wonder if the onset of a violent insurrection leads participants in a nonviolent campaign to abandon it in favor of the armed one (thereby increasing the latter’s size). Although this may be true for some of the most radical members of a nonviolent struggle, we doubt that participation in these two types of resistance is substitutable for the vast majority of participants in nonviolent campaigns. This might explain why armed rebellions are on average eleven times smaller than nonviolent mass campaigns as a proportion of the population (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

Finally, in model 9 we estimate the effects of violent flanks on the success of nonviolent campaigns to topple dictatorships and find that they have no significant impact on the outcomes of such struggles. In model 10, we estimate the effects of violent resistance campaigns in cases where the resistance is demanding national liberation, self-determination, or secession, and once again we find no violent flank effect in such cases.14 Overall our findings suggest that across a large number of cases, the presence of violent flanks does not have a positive impact on the probability of success for maximalist nonviolent campaigns—a finding that holds across country contexts and different campaign types. Moreover, despite bivariate results that suggest a negative correlation between intramovement violent flanks and campaign success, supplemental attempts to estimate models 1-10 using the disaggregated covariate (inframovement and extramovement violent flanks) yield identical results to the aggregate models.15 We did find that violent flanks tend to reduce participation in nonviolent campaigns, which may indeed diminish the chances for them to succeed. However, models 7 and 8 suggest that in cases where violent flanks do have effects, the effect diminishes if the nonviolent campaign manages to maintain support among a wide number of participants regardless of the risks.

Quantitative results such as these can establish correlational relationships only, but correlations are often quite revealing, and our ability to rule out a systematic and generalizable positive violent flank effect is itself an important finding. Otherwise, our null hypothesis (hypothesis 3) received the most support. Either the impacts are too varied within or across cases to make any generalizable conclusions, or violent flanks have no independent causal impacts on campaign outcomes. In addition, the finding that contemporaneous violent challenges are associated with lower participation rates may be an artifact of reverse causality rather than evidence that violent flanks reduce participation rates. As such, it is difficult from these findings to make confident causal inferences about the association between violent flanks and campaign success.

One way to deal with these possibilities is to use the different mechanisms emerging from the literature to gauge the plausibility of causal channels through which violent flanks could affect success rates, both positively and negatively. In the following section, we supplement the quantitative analysis with a brief analysis of two paired comparisons that encompass variation in outcomes of unarmed campaigns across the occurrence of extra- and intramovement violent campaigns. We do this to see whether examining mechanisms at play in each case can shed some light on the null finding in the quantitative results.

**COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES**

In this section, we leverage four comparative case studies to further evaluate the presence or absence of the mechanisms characterizing positive and negative violent flank effects. This comparison is not intended to be exhaustive or definitive, but rather illustrative of the way
scholars could evaluate the side-by-side operation of these mechanisms in the future. As such, we classify the case study comparison as a “plausibility probe” (George and Bennett 2004) to see what exploring these mechanisms can (and cannot) tell us about how positive and negative violent flank effects offset (or interact with) one another within single cases.

To avoid selecting on the dependent variable, we chose two cases of campaign success and two cases where the challengers did not obtain their stated objectives. Our case selection is driven by two logics: crossnational and longitudinal (see table 5). First, we examine two challenges with extramovement violent campaigns that occurred in different countries within the same geographic region during approximately the same time period: the People Power challenge in the Philippines (1983-1986) that succeeded, and the 8-8-88 challenge in Burma (1988) that did not succeed. Second, we rely on longitudinal variation within one country by examining two campaigns with an intramovement violent flank that had divergent outcomes: the South African antiapartheid challenge at an earlier point in time (T1, 1952-1961) that did not succeed and the antiapartheid challenge at a later point in time (T2, 1983-1994) that succeeded. Since we are interested in the presence or absence of mechanisms of the violent flank effect, we do not select nonviolent challenges where no violent flanks existed.

However, we are also careful to select cases where we can rule out the possibility of reverse causality between violent challenges and participation in nonviolent campaigns. In each of the four cases, armed insurrections either preceded the nonviolent challenges (Philippines, Burma, South Africa T2) or emerged during the peak of the nonviolent campaign’s participation (South Africa T1). This allows us to rule out the risk—at least in these four cases—that low participation rates in the unarmed challenges caused the violent flanks.

The People Power and 8-8-88 Challenges

In the Philippines two separate movements struggled to topple the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, who was elected to office in 1969 and declared martial law in 1972 to remain in power. The communist armed insurgency of the New People’s Army (NPA) commenced in 1969, and by the early 1980s had become fairly widespread in the countryside due to support from China, indiscriminate state repression, and the decreasing effectiveness of the Philippine military as a result of Marcos’s cronyism. The unarmed People Power challenge mobilized in 1983 after Benigno Aquino, an elite challenger to Marcos, was murdered upon his return to the Philippines from the U.S. While protest against Marcos had been increasing in the early 1980s, the assassination of Aquino triggered mass-based civil resistance campaigns that culminated in the People Power Revolution of February 1986, the abdi-
cation of Marcos, and a transition to democracy when Benigno Aquino’s widow, Corazón, assumed the presidency.

Regarding the positive violent flank mechanisms, the NPA likely made the nonviolent democratic opposition a much more acceptable alternative for the Marcos-alienated Filipino elite and middle class, whose interests were threatened by the revolutionary transformation the communists sought. Similarly, given the importance of the Philippines to the U.S. in the Cold War geopolitical context, elements of the U.S. government began to withdraw their support from Marcos and lend their support to the moderate democratic alternative to the communist insurgents. The U.S. State Department supported and cultivated ties with the democratic opposition and professional elements in the Philippines military. Eventually, at the apex of the challenge, the U.S. executive branch broke from Marcos and supported the People Power challenge as well (Bonner 1987; Thompson 1995).

Although the armed insurgency was growing in the countryside, it would be a stretch to claim that the armed insurgency created the political crisis that was subsequently resolved in favor of the nonviolent democratic opposition. The crisis in the Philippines was more directly a result of Marcos’s incompetence, corruption, and cronyism, all of which contributed to economic decline and alienated much of the population and elites. Ultimately, the crisis that forced Marcos from office came from the noncooperation and political defiance of millions of unarmed people during the People Power struggle. Moreover, although a communist oppositional culture was spreading throughout impoverished segments of the Philippines and among labor groups, it did not appear to have any consequential impact on the mobilization of the nonviolent democratic opposition, which was instead sparked by the assassination of Benigno Aquino. Although armed communist insurgents may have been able to protect peasants from state violence in some parts of the countryside, they clearly did not protect the democratic opposition from state violence.

There is only clear evidence for the presence of one of the negative violent flank mechanisms. The Marcos regime responded with widespread and indiscriminate repression of both armed and unarmed challengers, and it used the existence of armed challengers to justify its repression. However, repression did not effectively quell dissent. In fact, the assassination of Benigno Aquino backfired, and the mobilization of unarmed protest intensified. Finally, most likely due to the clear separation of the armed communist insurgency from the unarmed democratic struggle, the violence of the communists did not inhibit support for the nonviolent struggle, nor did it decrease the possibility that repression would backfire. The Catholic Church, for example, broke with the regime to support the unarmed challenge while remaining critical of the communists’ armed challenge (Wurfel 1988: 220-222). Thus, for the People Power campaign in the Philippines, the positive and negative violent flank effects may have offset one another regarding the outcome of the struggle (see table 6).

In Burma, General Ne Win assumed dictatorial power in March 1962, staging a coup against the democratic regime of U Nu. The military regime subsequently concentrated the control and management of the economy in the hands of the state, which limited the development of autonomous centers of wealth and power, and pursued an autarkic economic policy disengaged from the world economy. The result of the military-run economy was gross inefficiency, rampant corruption, and economic decline, leading to widespread popular grievances (Taylor 1987).

In 1987 grievances intensified after the government changed the denominations of the country’s currency without warning or compensation, leading to the immediate loss of many people’s life savings. University students began expanding their underground political networks, and protests erupted after the police killed a student in 1988. By August, millions of people led by Aung San Suu Kyi mobilized in unarmed antiregime protests. Armed ethnic and communist rebels in the periphery of the countryside had been engaged in armed struggle for decades. Thus, like the Philippines, when unarmed protest erupted against the military regime
in 1988, it occurred in a context in which armed insurgencies existed prior to and contemporaneously with—but independent from—the unarmed struggle (Lintner 1990).

Regarding the positive violent flank mechanisms, during the 8-8-88 challenge in Burma there is no clear evidence that the armed insurgencies made the unarmed protestors more acceptable to elements of the regime, elites, or third parties. Burma was extremely isolated, and the governments with the closest ties, Thailand, Japan, and China, were unwilling to stop backing the regime and support the unarmed insurrection (as occurred in the Philippines regarding the U.S.). Moreover, due to the regime’s autarkic economic policies, Burmese civil-society elements were relatively unconnected to external actors (Schock 2005). It was only after the 8-8-88 challenge that transnational networks developed to cultivate international support for the democratic struggle in Burma. Additionally, there is no clear evidence that the armed insurgents in the periphery created a crisis that facilitated the nonviolent struggle, or that separatists in the jungles forged an oppositional culture that diffused to facilitate mobilization of the nonviolent struggle. It was only after the suppression of the 8-8-88 challenge that some students and others left the cities to join the armed insurgents in the jungles. Where the insurgents controlled the periphery, they could often provide protection to those who joined the armed struggle, but the armed insurgents did not protect unarmed protestors in the cities from state violence.

Concerning the negative violent flank mechanisms, the existence of the armed insurgents did not seem to inhibit broad support for the 8-8-88 challenge. This may be due to the clear separation between the unarmed struggle in the cities and the armed challenges in the periph-

### Table 6. Presence of Mechanisms of Violent Flank Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Flank Effect Mechanisms</th>
<th>Extramovement</th>
<th>Intramovement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines,</td>
<td>Burma,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive violent flank effect mechanisms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent actors appear as a more acceptable alternative and are therefore supported by third parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent actors create a political crisis that is resolved in favor of nonviolent actors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion of oppositional culture from violent to nonviolent actors facilitates nonviolent mobilization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent actors protect nonviolent actors from state violence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative violent flank effect mechanisms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All challengers are discredited, thus inhibiting broad support or coalitions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities respond with widespread and indiscriminate repression</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fewer participants engage in nonviolent action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent actors alienate potential third-party supporters and decrease the possibility that repression backfires</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Violent flank impact on nonviolent campaign’s likelihood of success**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No net impact</th>
<th>Weak negative</th>
<th>Strong negative</th>
<th>Weak positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Note: “1” = clear evidence of the existence of the mechanism; “0” = no clear evidence.*
However, the government justified its unrelenting and indiscriminate repression of the unarmed protestors by arguing that the challenge, like the ongoing armed insurgencies, posed a grave threat to national security. In the aftermath of the widespread and indiscriminate repression of unarmed civilians during the 8-88 challenge, some young people fled to the country’s periphery intending to join the armed struggles. This reduced participation in the unarmed struggle and shifted the struggle to means with which the state had a decided advantage (Lintner 1990). Finally, there is no clear evidence that the armed insurgents alienated potential supporters of the unarmed challenges or decreased the likelihood of backfire. Thus, altogether a positive violent flank effect did not seem to have occurred in Burma—and more likely, the net impact of the violent insurgencies on the unarmed campaign was negative (see table 6).

Antiapartheid Challenges

The relationship between armed and unarmed struggle was much more complex in the case of the antiapartheid movement in South Africa, where the armed struggle was an intramovement phenomenon.

Inspired by Mohandas Gandhi’s struggle for liberation in India, the African National Congress (ANC) under the leadership of Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo, and Nelson Mandela proposed the use of civil resistance through boycotts, strikes, noncooperation and civil disobedience to challenge the racist apartheid system. The ANC subsequently formed alliances with trade unions, the South Africa Indian Congress (SAIC), and the South African Communist Party (SACP), and jointly launched the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign on June 26, 1952. The campaign transformed the ANC into a national mass-based organization with membership rising from approximately 7,000 to 100,000. Tens of thousands of Blacks began to defy unjust apartheid laws throughout South Africa (Kuper 1971).

On August 26, 1952 the government arrested, charged, and convicted national leaders of the ANC and SAIC under the Suppression of Communism Act. They received prison sentences or suspended sentences on the condition that they would not further violate the Act. By October 1952 more than 5,000 protestors had been arrested for participating in a campaign that was completely nonviolent. However by mid-October riots broke out in New Brighton, Port Elizabeth, Denver, Kimberely, and East London. In October and November, violence escalated as police killed a number of Blacks, and in retaliation Blacks killed a number of Whites. The Defiance Campaign organizers condemned the riots and violence; nevertheless the riots had an adverse effect on the movement by giving the state justification to unleash massive violence against all opponents. Moreover, the riots provided justification for the implementation of new repressive laws to control meetings and restrict activities of specific individuals. The state continued to ratchet up pressure by enacting the Criminal Law Amendment Act, which increased penalties for organizing or participating in campaigns of civil disobedience. Moreover, to inhibit mobilization in rural areas, the state prohibited meetings with more than ten Blacks in the “native areas” (Kuper 1971; Randle 1994: 73-74). The Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign was officially called off in April 1953 due to escalating violence and an increasingly repressive context.

Nevertheless resistance to apartheid continued in 1955 with Blacks boycotting the Bantu education system that placed Blacks into a track for low-wage jobs. In April 1955, parents organized against the school system, and more than 6,000 students boycotted schools. The government responded by threatening to not readmit boycotting students into any South African school if they did not return. With a lack of resources to provide alternative education, the school boycotts collapsed in July 1955 (Karis and Gerhart 1977).

The ANC launched the Congress of the People in 1955 with broad-based support. It adopted the Freedom Charter, which specified a vision of a multiracial democratic South Africa. They began to defy the pass laws, which required nonwhites to carry passes to reside
in or travel to certain areas, en masse. In 1956, 20,000 women defied the pass laws and marched in Pretoria. Once again, the government responded with repression and mass arrests (Kuper 1971; Randle 1994: 74).

In 1960, a breakaway group, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), formed and initiated a civil disobedience campaign against the pass laws. In March 1960, 50,000 people engaged in political defiance by descending on police stations without the requisite passes. In Sharpeville, security forces killed 69 people and injured 180. The government declared the PAC and the ANC illegal (Karis and Gerhart 1977).

The emergence of PAC and the escalation of government repression led ANC leaders to rethink strategy—not on organizing more effective nonviolent campaigns—but rather on adopting violence as a substitute. Adopting violent resistance was not a light decision, but ANC leaders felt that if they did not do so, more militant organizations would overtake them (Braithwaite 2013). In effect, a process of radicalization occurred whereby the more radical elements began to drive the entire movement. Moreover, by the early 1960s, the revolutions in Cuba and Algeria provided templates for successful violent struggle, which the ANC sought to replicate in South Africa (Barrell 1993).

In 1962, the ANC established its military wing, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK, Spear of the Nation). Acts of sabotage commenced within South Africa, and several hundred activists trained in guerrilla warfare techniques abroad. However, the government cast off any remaining restraints on state violence, and its iron fist devastated the movement. The state arrested the entire high command and sentenced them to life imprisonment. By 1964, the MK was decimated, campaigns of civil resistance stopped, and the ANC’s presence in South Africa became very limited for more than a decade (Lodge 2009, 214).

Positive violent flank mechanisms appeared absent during the antiapartheid struggle from 1952 to 1961. The implementation of violence, in the form of routine rioting in the 1950s and the turn to organized armed resistance in the early 1960s, did not make the civil resistance campaign appear to be a more acceptable alternative to third parties, elites, or elements of the government. Neither did the violence and adoption of armed struggle create a political crisis for the regime. There was no diffusion of an oppositional culture from those who supported violence that promoted the mobilization of an unarmed struggle. Finally, the violent actors did not protect unarmed actors from state violence, which instead became much more severe over time.

Regarding the negative violent flank mechanisms, the adoption of armed struggle led to the decimation of the civil resistance campaigns, inhibiting the formation of broad-based coalitions and allowing the government to discredit all challengers. Authorities responded with widespread repression that demobilized the campaign. The likelihood of backfire declined because the campaign adopted violence, thereby undermining the popular moral outrage the government’s brutality might have produced. Thus, there is no clear evidence that any of the mechanisms of a positive violent flank operated during this time, whereas all the negative violent flank mechanisms were present (see table 6).

The prospects of antiapartheid civil resistance reignited in 1976 when students began protesting against the imposition of Afrikaans—the language of the oppressor—as a medium of instruction. Students in Soweto schools went on strike and held a mass rally on June 16, 1976 involving up to 20,000 students. Police killed at least 176 of the students. The repression of young unarmed students backfired and brought increased international attention and more support for boycotts and sanctions. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 392, which condemned the police violence and the apartheid regime. Moreover, this excessive government violence outraged many White South Africans, and White students from University of Witwatersrand marched in protest (Marx 1992).18

In 1979 ANC leaders visited with communist leaders in Vietnam, where they learned of the importance of building an unarmed organizational base through which a large segment of the population could participate in political struggle (Barrell 1993). This represented a shift in
strategic thinking, since the ANC had erstwhile concentrated its efforts on recruiting, training, and deploying guerrilla forces. The armed wing of the ANC continued with acts of sabotage and armed attacks, but these were largely symbolic. The MK was not meant to provide a serious military challenge to the regime, but instead enhance the ANC’s popular status and promote a mass-based following (Lodge 2009, 214-215).

Nonviolent resistance exploded in South Africa in 1983 after the rejection of political reforms and the creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), which acted as an umbrella organization coordinating hundreds of organizations and diverse local struggles into an effective national antiapartheid struggle. Its goal was to engage in a coordinated political struggle against the apartheid regime rather than to develop a single “correct” ideological stance. Thus the group cultivated an oppositional consciousness that facilitated the mobilization of a broad base. The coalition devolved leadership to local levels, enhancing resilience when the government arrested or killed more prominent leaders. The UDF incorporated a wide range of nonviolent actions and responded creatively to government repression.19

Tactics of dispersion, such as general strikes and boycotts, were innovative responses to increased repression against tactics of concentration, such as public rallies and protest demonstrations. Despite the extreme intensification of repression during the states of emergency, the movement remained resilient due to its decentralized structure, tactical innovation, and its ability to shift from one set of tactics to another (Schock 2005).

Social movement unionism facilitated the resilience of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), inhibited the labor movement from being state cooptation into the its industrial relations apparatus, and permitted it to pursue political as well as economic objectives. The federated relations between the UDF and COSATU, whereby each organization remained autonomous from the other while pursuing coordinated action against the state, ensured the resilience of the movement as well. For example, when the state targeted its repression on the activities of the UDF during a state of emergency, COSATU took the lead in the challenge to apartheid by organizing and implementing the Mass Democratic Movement (Schock 2005).

The rejection of political reforms by nonwhites and their protests against the state undermined the state’s attempts to legitimate its racist rule. The challenge continued in the face of brutal states of emergency, thereby removing any remaining regime legitimacy, contributing to the condemnation of the apartheid regime by third parties, and triggering increased international sanctions. By the late 1980s, the winding down of the Cold War may have also facilitated international support for the antiapartheid challenge. The labor movement directly undermined the regime through strikes and slowdowns and contributed to the flight of foreign capital (Wood 2000). Moreover, the boycott of White businesses and international sanctions made it clear to many that the apartheid system had to be reformed, driving a wedge between capitalists and the state and promoting divisions among political elites.

The relative importance of the armed and unarmed insurrections in the antiapartheid struggle is complex and controversial. Some argue that the two strategies were complementary (Braithwaite 2013; Lodge 2009; Seidman 2001), while others maintain that the armed struggle played a far less important role than unarmed resistance, labor strikes and capital flight in toppling the apartheid system (Barrell 1993; Wood 2000; Zunes, Asher, and Kurtz 1999).

Two positive violent flank mechanisms appeared to be present. White university students, church groups, and various international actors began supporting the unarmed challenge that emerged after Soweto and intensified in the 1980s, generating a nonviolent alternative that elicted more broad-based support than did the armed struggle. Moreover, the culture of resistance forged by the ANC and their acts of “armed propaganda” facilitated the mobilization of protest against apartheid. The UDF and COSATU understood that this “iconography of violence” was part of the ANC’s broader struggle (Barrell 1993).
However, the armed struggle did not create the political crisis itself, which was much more a function of the ungovernability of the townships and labor strikes that undermined the apartheid regime’s dependence on Black labor (Schock 2005; Wood 2000). Although the South African government spent considerable resources for the purpose of limiting the possibilities of an effective guerrilla insurgency, the main challenge to apartheid occurred through the unarmed protests that emerged with Soweto and intensified with the rejection of political reforms and labor strikes in the 1980s. Finally, the armed wing of the ANC did not appear to protect the unarmed protestors in the townships from state repression.

Concerning the negative violent flank mechanisms, it is clear that the regime responded with widespread and indiscriminate repression against all challengers, armed and unarmed. However, the antiapartheid movement continued to mobilize widespread participation as well as broad support, domestically among White South Africans and internationally among transnational solidarity networks and foreign governments. Most likely this was due to the fact that the armed violence of the ANC was extremely restrained, focusing on physical facilities and not on White civilians, and the fact that most of the Black violence in the townships was targeted at other Blacks perceived as collaborators rather than at White civilians. These factors contributed to the maintenance of international mobilization against the apartheid regime despite challenger violence, and the enduring possibility of backfire (see table 6).

Of the cases briefly examined here, the role of violence was undoubtedly the most complex with regard to the struggle in South Africa. Whereas the armed insurgencies in the Philippines and Burma represented strands of resistance apart from the unarmed insurrections, the armed actions of the ANC were part of and complementary to the struggles being waged largely through unarmed methods in the townships and mines. The antiapartheid struggle adopted the frames and rhetoric forged by the ANC through many years of resistance, and these promoted mobilization throughout South Africa. The armed attacks on state military installations and acts of “armed propaganda” had a symbolic importance and boosted antiapartheid activists’ morale (Barrell 1993). Armed activists forged underground networks that they subsequently used to funnel resources to the unarmed insurrections in the townships (Seidman 2001). In the townships, while recognizing the symbolic role of violence, COSATU attempted to channel the actions of militant youth into more strategically effective campaigns of nonviolent action. Thus, although the armed wing of the ANC was never a military threat to the apartheid regime, it did contribute to the mobilization of the urban unarmed insurrection through the diffusion of an oppositional consciousness.

The apartheid regime always held the clear strategic advantage with regard to the means of violence, but the antiapartheid struggle featured instances of coercive mobilization, the murder or alleged collaborators—often through the grisly act of necklacing—and battles between armed security forces and youths armed with stones, Molotov cocktails, and occasionally guns. If these actions promoted levels of mobilization in nonviolent campaigns that would not have otherwise occurred, these violent actions would have increased the antiapartheid movement’s power. However, these increases must be weighed against the loss of support from nonwhites and third parties who might have been forthcoming if these acts of violence did not occur. Besides, the antiapartheid struggle could not have succeeded without broad-based campaigns of nonviolent action. It was the ability of the antiapartheid struggle to exploit the state’s dependence relations and mobilize the support of third parties—largely through unarmed methods rather than through violence—that promoted the political transition that followed.

**DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS**

Although references to radical and violent flank effects are common, few studies have systematically examined them across a large number of cases. Moreover, there has been a lack of conceptual clarity concerning what constitutes a violent flank, the specification of
causal mechanisms through which a violent flank effect (whether intra- or extramovement) might operate, and whether their political effects are generally short or long term. We have attempted to address these issues by specifying eight causal mechanisms through which violent flanks might impact the outcomes of nonviolent resistance campaigns. While there are considerable obstacles to identifying causal effects with confidence, scholars can take a reasoned look at the relative effectiveness of predominantly nonviolent campaigns with or without violent flanks even if the measures of such terms are imperfect.

In the quantitative part of this study, we find no evidence that violent flanks positively impact the success rates of nonviolent campaigns across the 106 nonviolent campaigns with maximalist objectives between 1900 and 2006. Instead, violent flanks are associated with a lower level of participation in nonviolent campaigns, which may in turn be associated with a lower likelihood of success.

In the qualitative part of this study, the results are likewise mixed. Based on the causal mechanisms that should be related to the occurrence of a violent flank effect, we find that a negative violent flank effect operates in two unsuccessful campaigns: the antiapartheid challenge T₁ (1952-1961) in South Africa, and the 8-8-88 (1988) challenge in Burma. There are indications of no net impact of positive and negative violent flank mechanisms in the People Power challenge in the Philippines (1983-1986) and violent flanks appear to have a weak positive impact on the outcome of the successful antiapartheid challenge T₂ in South Africa (1983-1994). Despite the evidence for a positive violent flank in this case, the effect is weak and demonstrates that the negative effects can easily outweigh any positive violent flank effects (and vice versa).

All told, our study has several important conclusions. First, there is very little evidence to support the idea that violent flanks provide systematic strategic benefits to nonviolent campaigns seeking maximalist objectives. Our quantitative evidence suggests that the most important determinant of nonviolent campaign success is mass participation, a finding consistent with previous studies (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). To the extent that violent flanks reduce participation rates, they also reduce the overall chances of nonviolent campaign success.

That said, violent flanks might have unpredictable impacts across cases—an insight emerging out of our case studies. Our paired comparisons reveal that many nonviolent campaigns—such as the People Power movement in the Philippines—toil simultaneously with violent campaigns and wage effective unarmed struggles regardless of their coexistence. In other cases—such as the earlier antiapartheid campaign and the 8-8-88 campaign in Burma—violent flanks appeared to drive down the chances of success for otherwise nonviolent campaigns by legitimating repression, demobilizing participants, shifting to violent strategies where the state is superior, and discrediting regime opponents. And in other cases—such as South Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s—the situation is much more complex, revealing both positive and negative violent flank effects that might ultimately have had a weak positive impact. The fact that violent flanks have such varying effects across contexts yields some insight into the reasons why the statistical study did not demonstrate clear-cut results for a negative violent flank effect either.

In cases where violent flanks appeared to have some positive effects (the Philippines and South Africa T₂), the impacts of those positive flanks were largely short-term and symbolic rather than long-term and functional. Moreover, in both cases, repression served as a precipitant rather than a deterrent to mass participation. In fact, the key variable for the success of both campaigns was not the amount of violence that accompanied them, but rather the ability to build popular participation in the campaign, remain resilient in repressive contexts, and to sever the state from its sources of support at home and abroad.

More generally, our study challenges uncritical views of the power of violence by suggesting that while positive violent flank effects may contribute to the success of some nonviolent campaigns, they might be unnecessary for these movements to succeed. And in two of our cases (Burma and South Africa T₁), a negative violent flank effect undermined the power
of the unarmed resistance. The oppositional culture of a violent campaign may promote solidarity and commitment to a cause, but it does not necessarily bring the movement directly closer to its ultimate goals.

Indeed, both the quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that positive violent flank effects are less common than many assume. In both South Africa and the Philippines, violent challenges by themselves were unable to topple oppressive regimes, and it was unarmed resistance rather than violent resistance that provided the most serious challenge to the regimes and culminated in systemic change. As a result, we can argue with some confidence that on average, maximalist nonviolent campaigns often succeed despite violent flanks—rarely because of them.

**FUTURE STEPS**

This research is limited in several key ways. First, our definition of violent flanks is necessarily overaggregated. With limited resources, we were unable to differentiate between small-scale acts of violence and full-fledged armed groups emerging from within otherwise nonviolent campaigns. Second, in the quantitative analysis, the results can establish only correlation but not causation. Perhaps the most troubling inferential problem is the possibility of reverse causality—that small campaigns are the ones most likely to adopt violent flanks as a way to compensate for their small size, thereby undermining the finding that violent flanks lead campaigns to reduce their size. Third, the possibility of omitted variable bias remains. Specifically, because of the structure of the data, we are unable to properly assess the impacts that unobserved variables (like episodes of repression) might have on both our main independent variables (violent flanks, participation) and dependent variable (outcome). As a consequence, both reverse causality and endogeneity bias may be driving the results from the quantitative analysis. Fourth, we do not measure the impact of the violent flank mechanisms precisely enough to conclude the impact of the presence/absence of positive and negative violent flank effects with great confidence. We began to address this with our qualitative comparisons, which looked at specific mechanisms within specific cases of success and non-success. Qualitative comparisons can allow researchers to account for both omitted variable bias and the problems of causal sequencing. We necessarily abbreviated the discussion of these issues due to length constraints.

Future research should therefore advance the study of violent flanks in several key ways. First, scholars should collect and analyze data at a much more granular unit of analysis. Event-level data could allow for a much more nuanced examination of how nonviolent campaigns make different strategic choices over time, particularly as they interact with their opponents. It could allow researchers to see whether violent flanks preceded or followed declines in popular mobilization, for example, which would help us to address problems of reverse causality. Second, researchers could disaggregate violent flanks by different qualitative indicators, such as the degree of violence, type of violence, timing of violence, and targets of violence involved. Third, researchers should expand the cases under examination. Such study could expand the types of campaigns (e.g., nonmaximalist) and select campaigns that occurred across much more diverse geographic and temporal contexts. Fourth, future research could attempt to account for potential omitted variable bias by evaluating how factors like campaign leadership, state repression, or various campaign characteristics might affect both the onset of violent flanks and the ultimate outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. Fifth, qualitative case studies could advance knowledge on this topic by identifying cases where nonviolent campaigns effectively avoided or staved off the emergence of violent flanks—an inquiry which might be particularly useful to movements seeking to succeed without using violence. Finally, researchers should construct more precise measures of the impact (rather than mere presence or absence) of violent flank effects.
In conclusion, Herbert Haines's statement is just as relevant today as it was a generation ago: “The difficulties in identifying positive and negative radical flank effects with confidence are considerable. . . . But these difficulties are not insurmountable, and if we are to understand collective action more completely, we need to carry on the search for evidence of radical flank effects” (1984: 42). We hope that this study has shed some light on the issue and promotes the further examination of violent flank effects.

ENDNOTES

1 In this article we use the terms “campaign,” “movement,” “challenge,” and “struggle” interchangeably. We use the terms he terms “violent” and “armed” interchangeably. Finally, we use the terms “nonviolent resistance,” “nonviolent struggle,” “nonviolent armed struggle,” “nonviolent tactics,” and “civil resistance” interchangeably.

2 While recognizing that the term “flank” often connotes a wing of a coherent struggle (i.e., an intramovement violent flank), we also use the term “flank” to refer to an armed struggle that exists contemporaneously with and has the same opponent—but is unrelated to—an unarmed challenge (i.e., an extramovement violent flank).

3 In the conflict literature, scholars refer to the negative impact of violence as “spoiling” (Stedman 1997).

4 “Backfire” as developed by Martin (2007), is a more general dynamic that encompasses what Sharp (1973, 2005) refers to as “political jiu jitsu” (see also Hess and Martin 2006; Martin 2015).

5 But see Goldstone (1980) whose reanalysis of Gamson’s data suggests that aspects of the political context were more important determinants of success than challenger characteristics.

6 The social movements literature on radical flank effects nevertheless yields numerous important inferences out of which to derive and test hypotheses.

7 As such, our inferences are likewise limited to violent flanks rather than radical flanks per se.

8 Data and replication materials are available on Erica Chenoweth’s website: http://www.ericachenoweth.com/research.

9 We use NAVCO 1.1 rather than NAVCO 2.0 for two reasons. First, NAVCO 1.1 contains six more cases than NAVCO 2.0 because its coverage extends back to 1900. Second, we disaggregated the violent flank variable in NAVCO 1.1 to code for both intramovement and extramovement violent flanks. NAVCO 2.0 contains a variable for violent flanks but does not specify whether the flanks were intramovement or extramovement.

10 Because of missing values, we do not include this measure in every model.

12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

13 Marginal effects refer to the change in the dependent variable for every single-unit change in the independent variable, holding other variables at their means. In the case of dichotomous independent variables, the marginal effect represents the change in the dependent variable when the independent variable moves from 0 to 1. For continuous independent variables, the marginal effect is the change in the dependent variable when the independent variable increases by a single standard deviation.

14 Due to the extremely small number of observations in Models 9 and 10, we reiterate the suggestive nature of these correlations rather than view them as definitive findings.

15 Supplementary results are available from the authors upon request. Notably, we created interaction terms to see whether there was a conditional effect of democracy on the effect of a violent flank and found no evidence for this. We also created interaction terms to examine the impacts of a violent flank conditional on different levels of state capacity and similarly found no significant impacts.

16 A third campaign, the secessionist struggle waged by the Moro Liberation Front in the state of Mindanao, did not seem to have a significant impact on the dynamics of the struggle to topple Marcos.

17 We recognize the limitations of simply adding up the presence/absence of positive and negative violent flank mechanisms, as for example, the presence of a specific positive violent flank mechanism may have a greater impact on the trajectory of a struggle than does the presence of a specific negative violent flank mechanism (and vice versa).

18 Until more precise measures of the mechanisms are developed, readers should read these conclusions as suggestive.

19 In the aftermath of Soweto the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) emerged in 1978 to challenge the apartheid system. Like the ANC, AZAPO supported the use of violence to overthrow the state, but differed from the ANC in that it opposed multiracialism and called for a transformation of the capitalist economic system in addition to the end of apartheid. However, AZAPO did not seem to be consequential for the overall trajectory of the antiapartheid movement in the 1980s and early 1990s.

20 Challengers did not necessarily conceive of their strategy as one involving “methods of nonviolent action” (see Seidman 2001, Wink 1987).

21 We also recognize the possibility that the unarmed challenges in the Philippines and South Africa might have been unable to topple the regimes without the violent challenges—a counterfactual that is impossible to test.
REFERENCES


Violent Flank Effects


